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Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American 
Tragedy, by Telford Taylor 
by Mat:cus G. Raskin 
Marcus Raskin. is co-director of The Institute for Policy 
Study, in Washington, D. C. Author of the forthcoming 
book Being and Doing, he has written extensively on 
Military planning, Foreign policy, and education. As 
Director of the Institute, he has played a large role in 
initiating and developing a systematic critique of the 
National Security Bureaucracies and Priorities. 
Telford Taylor, brilliant lawyer, scholar, chief war 
crimes prosecutor, even musician, but especially citizen, 
has written an important book about the law of war 
crimes and its relevance to Vietnam. In Nuremberg and 
Vietnam Taylor discusses in crisp but fervent style the 
history of the distinction between just and unjust wars 
as well as the generally accepted meanings of war crimes 
prior to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. H.e appears to 
define war crimes as those acts which are contrary to 
international law, e.g. treaties, or are in violation of 
either the military or civilian law of the perpetrator's 
own nation. Taylor's scholarly honesty shows through in 
the book, and his civic love for his country manifests it-
self in his analysis and the book's dedication "To the 
Flag and The Liberty and Justice For Which It Stantls." 
Taylor says he favored the American war in Vietnam 
until 1965. However, by that time he had begun to re-
evaluate his own position. In the last several years he has 
found it necessary to clarify the meanings of the 
Nuremberg judgments since many people were invoking 
their own interpretations and calling upon him, as a 
principal at Nuremberg, to legitimate their views. He 
rejects a wide application of the Nuremberg judgments 
stating that the courts are not "a suitable forum for the 
settlement of our Vietnam problem" since treaties-
whether the U.N. Charter or the unratified London 
Charter agreements which set up the Nuremberg 
tribunals-would not necessarily take precedence over 
congressional actions authorizing the Vietnam war. On 
the other hand, as the nature of the war has become 1
: Nuremberg and Vietnam
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
more obvious, he has accepted the relevance of those 
judgments and international treaties such as the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 which deal with prisoners, the 
wounded and civilian population. 
The issues analyzed in Nuremberg and Vietnam were 
raised in the Boston 5 draft conspiracy case where 
Taylor (with Calvin Bartlett and Carl Sapers) defended 
me. All questions raised by the defendants about war 
crimes and the war's constitutionality were dismissed 
out of hand by the judge although they hung heavy over 
the courtroom as they hang heavy over American 
society. The banner of the Nuremberg judgments has 
been carried by upholders of the United Nations, 
pacifists, individuals against bureaucratic and executive 
frolics, the New Left and draft resisters. Even imperial 
stalwarts who sanctioned the American enterprise in 
Vietnam, such as Thurman Arnold, have raised the 
Nuremberg banner. They believed that the United States 
could justify intervention by deciding on its own initia-
tive when an aggression had taken place against other 
nations. How is it that the Nuremberg judgments are 
introduced by people who hold divergent points of 
view? Taylor points out that "Nuremberg is both what 
actually happened there and what people think hap-
pened, and the second is more important than the first." 
He suggests that what people are reaching for is a new 
objective expression, a consciousness of a fundamental 
morality. This common denominator attempts to define 
"some universal standards of human behavior that 
transcend the duty of obedience to national laws." His 
view is that the war crimes trials brought to international 
law an attempt to enforce personal responsibility for 
crimes against peace and the development of criminal 
liability for violation of the laws of war. Yet, in 
exploring the meaning of this view Taylor is aware that 
the law, in addition to articulating the moral strivings of 
a people, must also be enforceable. Conseque~ tly, the 
procedures and forums for enforcement become a 
primary problem. 
The Nuremberg trials were judgments of victors over 
vanquished, although the elements of vengeance were 
mediated through law and justice. The trials were con-
ducted over a five-year period in some 10,000 cases. 
They involved laws as old as western civilization. What-
ever we might think of those cases, Taylor holds that 
there is one point beyond dispute. It was not only the 
people but the System which embraced war crimes trials 
as a means of holding individuals and governments to 
account: 
" ... the United States Government stood legally, 
politically and morally committed to the principles 
enunciated in the charters and judgments of the tribu-
nals. The President of the United States, on the recom-
mendation o(the Departments of State, War and Justice 
approved the war crimes program. Thirty or more 
American judges drawn from appellate benches of the 
states ... conducted the later Nuremberg trials and 
wrote the opinions." 
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While the nation was committed to the idea that 
leadership could be held to account for war crimes and 
war matters, Taylor points out, the laws and rules were 
"very fuzzy around the edges." This lack of definition 
does not deprive nations of an indisputable core of 
international and domestic law which is quite applicable 
to the behavior of Americans at war with Vietnam. We 
know, for example, that under international law armed 
forces are bound to obey only lawful orders. As 
Lauterpacht, the great international legal scholar, has 
said, "They cannot therefore escape liability if, in 
obedience to a command, they commit acts which both 
violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the 
general sentiment of humanity." 
Thus, as a general rule the individual soldier may be 
held liable for war crimes even though he is carrying out 
an order of a superior officer. According to the United 
States Army's current field manual, a soldier can success-
fully interpose superior orders as a defense only where 
"he did not know and could not reasonably have been 
expected to know that the order was unlawful." It 
would seem that this defense can be offered where the 
individual's act is an extremely small incident in an 
organized pattern, program or strategy. 
The army's current manual states: "obedience to law-
ful military orders is the duty of every member of the 
armed forces." Taylor suggests that whetherthe defense 
of superior orders is valid or not, any leader who expects 
obedience must accept legal responsibility for the. acts of 
troops under his command. This is especially true in the 
case of military commanders. 
The Canadians, in their War Crimes Regulations, have 
said that "where there is evidence that more than one 
war crime has been committed by members of a forma-
tion, unit, body, or group while under the command of a 
single commander, the court may receive that evidence 
as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of the com-
mander for those crimes." According to this standard it 
would seem hard for a military commander to escape 
responsibility for the crimes inherent in incidents such as 
Son My, assassination programs, area bombing tactics 
for the purpose of terrorizing the population and gener-
ating refugees, mass deportations, use of various forms of 
poisoned materials, and failure to provide care to the 
wounded and defenseless. Each has been part of a 
military program and pattern in Vietnam. Each is a con-
tinuous programmed activity. 
In American law the standard for responsibility does 
not appear to be any the less than that put forward by 
the Canadians. In the Yamashita case, the commander of 
Japanese forces in the Pacific was held responsible and 
was executed for not preventing and controlling troops 
under his command who committed war crimes even 
though he neither knew about them nor sanctioned 
them. At the time of Yamashi ta's crime Japanese forces 
were in full retreat and Y amashita's communication lines 
with his troops were cut by American troops. In its 
defense of the far-reaching and harsh judgment made on 
Yamashita, the U.S. Supreme Court argued that 
American officers were not exempt from the laws of 
war. They could be held to the same standard and 
penalized by American tribunals when they acted 
contrary to those rules. There is little difference be-
tween the actions alleged in the Yamashita case and the 
programs which have been trumpeted by American com-
manders in Vietnam. If the Yamashita standard was 
applied to the Vietnam war as Taylor suggests, the 
responsibility for Son My would be placed squarely on 
the American military commander though he might not 
even have known about the incident. It should be noted 
that General Westmoreland had continuous and virtually 
instantaneous communications with tactical units oper-
ating in the field as well as with Honolulu and Washing-
ton command centers. As a matter of policy General 
Westmoreland urged military commanders to have high 
body counts. In a guerrilla war the consequences of such 
a policy is that the entire civilian population of a con-
tested area becomes the enemy. Given reliance on fire-
power and the fact that all Vietnamese were perceived 
as enemies or potential enemies, it is no wonder that 
Son My and other such incidents occur. Everyone in a 
designated war zone becomes fair game. As Sartre has 
pointed out, an invading force of a highly industrial 
power cannot stop itself from using genocidal techniques 
to beat down a hostile population. 
While Taylor argues that criminal responsibility must 
attach itself both to commanders who knew of war 
crimes and to commanders who had military responsi-
bility for them even if they did not know of the actual 
incidents, he does not see how civilians can be held 
responsible. It is at this point that international law be-
comes fuzzy. Despite the law's indistinct contours, top 
Nazi civilians were convicted for war crimes. Two 
theories of criminal responsibility were posited at 
Nuremberg: the theory of crimes against humanity 
(murder, genocide, inhumane acts against non-combatant 
populations) and the theory of crimes against peace 
(violations of international treaties and the pursuit of a 
policy of aggressive war). Three Nazi civilian leaders 
were convicted under these theories. The Tokyo tribunal 
convicted Koki Hirota, who served briefly as Prime 
Minister and for several years as Foreign Minister be-
tween 1933 and 1938, of war crimes for failing to stop 
the atrocities known as "the rape of Nanking." Under 
the Tokyo Tribunal's judgment it was held that political 
leaders who either authorize or have knowledge of illegal 
battlefield practices are responsible for the commission 
of war crimes. Thus there is precedent from the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo tribunals for the criminal conviction of 
civilians both on the basis of atrocities against non-
combatants which, as part of the chain of command, 
they had a duty to prevent, and on the basis of the 
"aggressive war" policies the civilian leaders helped to 
develop. 1 In his dissent in the Yamashita case Justice 
Murphy feared that "The fate of some future President 
of the United States and his chiefs of staff and his 
military advisors may well have been sealed by this 
decision." Interpreting this phrase strictly it would 
appear to apply the command liability of Yamashita to 
officials in their military capacities who should have had 
knowledge of war crimes. 
The extraordinary fact of the American government 
is that since the end of the second world war there has 
been a fusion of military and civilian roles. Since 1945 3
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the role of the civilianized military and the militarized 
civilian have been shaped by and have shaped American 
national security affairs. Under the National Security 
Act of 1947 military and civilian distinctions were 
blurred by law and in the bureaucracy they were blurred 
in practice. Distinctions between war and peace were 
viewed as belonging to an unsophisticated time. War, 
continuous military engagement and the display of 
power in other lands, became ends in themselves without 
reference to purpose or legitimacy. The talents and 
resources of the society were forged into the sword of 
continuing war. Vietnam was the active fulfillment of 
the imperial mission. The "brightest and the best" (such 
as McNamara, the brothers Bundy and Rost ow, and 
Rusk) ran the engine of war for lhe Mission. It was they 
who ordered the bombings (the "turning of the screw" 
as it was called), the population removal, the reliance on 
overwhelming firepower, and the policy of not taking 
prisoners. The militarized civilian gave the go-ahead for 
reprisals, aggressive military actions and signed on to 
programs which by their nature resulted in war crimes. 
To draw a distinction in responsibility for war crimes be-
tween the civilianized military and the militarized 
civilian in the national security state is like attempting to 
draw lines in water; both are culpable under present 
standards. Yet, it is likely that the Attorney General 
would not prosecute former national security officials, 
nor would the Supreme Court be likely to rule on this 
matter if brought forth as a defense by an officer 
accused of war crimes in a military case. 
Taylor is right about the inapplicability of war crime 
sanctions to civilians; there is an anomaly in the law. 
Military commanders can be held responsible under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, but civilian policy 
makers can escape judgment because no indictment will 
be brought. Acting for the state, they are placed above 
the law. 
Some judges and scholars have argued, and Taylor 
tends to agree, that Congress, the people's voice, sup-
ported and advocated the course taken in Vietnam. 
According to this reasoning, in terms of American con-
stitutional law the Vietnam adventure cannot be viewed 
as an unconstitutional executive frolic. This argument 
has been made as a possible defense for the civilian 
policy-makers. But even if the Congress assented to the 
Vietnam war, there is nothing in the Cons ti tu tion to 
suggest that Congress has unlimited power to vote funds 
and commit lives to military adventures for the purpose 
of ideological or bureaucratic vindication. 
In Fleming v. Page, Chief Justice Taney spoke for the 
Supreme Court when he said that Congress's power to 
declare war was, in fact, limited. By this he meant that it 
cannot "be presumed to be waged for the purpose of 
conquest or the acquisition of territory ... [but] the 
genius and character of our ins ti tu tions are peaceful, and 
the power to declare war was not conferred upon 
Congress for the purpose of aggression or aggrandize-
ment, but to enable the general government to vindicate 
by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights 
and the rights of its citizens." While there is much which 
suggests that the extent of our military actions in Viet-
nam was for the purpose of vindicating a clique in the 
American government who, through their decisions, 
actions and programs, involved the United States more 
and more deeply, it can hardly be said that either the 
rights of American citizens or the general government of 
the United States was under attack by North Vietnam or 
the National Liberation Front. 
1 introduce this to point up two issues. First, the fact 
that Congress voted appropriations for the Vietnam war 
does not mean, nor is there any indication in the legisla-
tive history to suggest, that such appropriations were to 
be construed as support for the war. Indeed, the Chair-
man of the House Appropriations Committee, and 
various other Congressmen made it clear that voting sup-
port for American troops should not be construed as 
support of the war. Congressmen emphasized that they 
voted funds in fear that American troops would be 
stranded without means of defending themselves. 
Second, even if Congress were judged as having forfeited 
its right to object to the war because it was hoodwinked 
into supporting the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, there is 
nothing to suggest that Congress has the power to 
declare war for frivolous reasons-whether for land or in 
vindication of particular arrangements made by the CIA, 
military advisory teams or the national security bureauc-
racy. Thus, a defense based upon alleged congressional 
approval would be invalid. 
It must be remembered that perpetual military 
engagement abroad itself helps to generate the situation 
of crisis and apparent danger to American "interests." 
Such crises can be manipulated by secret and unaccount-
able policy-making institutions for political purposes. 
_ For example, during the Johnson and Kennedy Adminis-
trations there was the 303 Committee, a high spy tribu-
nal in the national security apparatus chaired by 
McGeorge Bundy. Its major task was both planning and 
reviewing military and CIA provocation activities around 
the world. If reference were made in this group to anti-
force treaties or international law, it was for the purpose 
of circumventing them. From the committee members' 
public statements it appears that any concern they had 
for the law was in finding ways to make it serve or 
justify provocative and aggressive actions. The Tuesday 
lunch group which chose bombing targets in North Viet-
nam did not begin its meetings by reviewing the Kellogg-
Briand Pact or the U.N. Charter. It would seem that the 
people and Congress have a right to disavow their un-
knowing complicity in such matters. Taylor argues that 
the classification laws all but eliminate the possibility of 
finding out what happened in Vietnam. If this were the 
case the leaders of government could mask their criminal 
or unlawful behavior. Consequently the only way justice 
could be done is by a revolution that lays open the files 
or as the result of a war in which the United States is 
overrun. Neither of these alternatives is tolerable. 
Perhaps, as Dag Hammarsjold thought, it is necessary 
for smaller nations to discipline the leadership of the 
large nations since no nation is great enough to discipline 
its own. The legality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam 
could be brought to the International Court of Justice. 
Since both the complainant (a small state such as 
Sweden, for example) and the United States are parties 
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to the optional clause, the International Court would 
likely have jurisdiction. The United States would not be 
able to invoke the Connally reservation since interpreta-
tion of the anti-force articles and treaties such as the 
U .N. Charter and Kellogg Pact are not domestic ques-
tions. The small state could then argue that the Inter-
national Court had jurisdiction since a weak state in a 
world run by highly-armed countries has a vital interest 
in the great powers observing the U.N. Charter sections 
and treaty obligations. Had such a case been brought by 
Cambodia in early 1970, that nation might not have 
been laid waste. It should be noted that if such a case 
were brought and successfully argued against the Ui:tited 
States, it would mean that officials who operated in the 
framework of aggressive war would be in specific viola-
tion of the anti-force treaties and could be held responsi-
ble. Yet, self-disciplining and the forming of an internal 
accountability system is to be preferred. 
The United States has prided itself on the ideology of 
accountability of its officials. This has been expressed, in 
the past, through the electoral process. But as that 
process becomes more peripheral to bureaucratic and 
institutional forces which are not subject to the elective 
process, redress through the courts becomes crucial. 
There is no reason why under present law the Supreme 
Court could not appoint a master, as in the situation of 
difficult anti-trust cases, to sift evidence and to ascertain 
whether there was a pattern of provocation which 
breached international law. Once remedial actions could 
be brought in the courts, citizens would not be without 
recourse against untrammeled and lawless policy-makers. 
One would have thought that the Tokyo and Nurem-
berg judgments would have resulted in a code of be-
havior for civilians in the national security bureaucracy 
which could be enforced either by citizens or the 
Attorney General. It is crucial that Congress now initiate 
a code of conduct for national security officials using as 
the key the Tokyo and Nuremberg judgments. Such a 
code would define the difference between the use of 
military force for aggressive purposes, and its use in 
defense of the people of the United States. It should be 
remembered that in the World War II precedents a num-
ber of the accused in the Far East were sentenced to life 
imprisonment for crimes against peace. 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, it is likely 
that many people in the name of a national community 
will insist that questions of war and peace should be 
decided by the people as a community, and not by the 
rulers. It will be insisted that the community have power 
to punish those who arrogate this authority unjustly to 
themselves. To achieve this goal will demand creative 
thought, teaching, and political struggles. In this and the 
other suggested reforms, it is to be hoped that Telford 
Taylor will play a large role. 
I. There is a history in America on the matter of personal 
responsibility which goes back before the Nuremberg cases. In 
I 927 Senator Borah sponsored a resolution in the U.S. Senate as 
a way to protect the people against the follies of government 
which would then protect1awful governing. The resolution 
stated that as war had been a lawful institution among states, he 
wanted the Senate to resolve 
"that it is the view of the Senate of the United States that war 
between nations should be outlawed as an institution or means 
for the settlement of international controversies by making it a 
public crime under the law of nations, and that every nation 
should be encouraged by solemn agreement or treaty to bind 
itself to indict and punish its own international war-breeders or 
instigators and war profiteers under powers similar to those 
conferred upon our Congress under Article I, Section 8 of our 
Federal Constitution, which clothes the Congress with the power 
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations .... " 
The United States pressed Borah's argument in the allied case 
against Japanese leaders who were successfully tried for war 
crimes after the Second World War. 
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